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A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Raymond
Frances Reddick ("Reddick") and
Harvey Lee Southall of second degree
murder and the unlawful use ofa handgun. Although the sentencing guidelines suggested a twenty-five year sentence, Judge Hammerman imposed a
thirty year sentence for the second degree murder conviction and ten years
for the handgun violation, to be served
concurrently. The Judge believed that
the sentence was justified in light of
the degree ofviolence ofthe crime and
the devastating impact the defendants'
actions had on the victim's family. In
addition, Judge Hammerman was concerned about the fmancial burden the
defendants' actions had placed upon
the victim's family. Medical and funeral expenses amounted to $6,000. In
light of this burden, the Judge offered
each defendant the opportunity to reduce his sentence to twenty-five years
upon payment of $3,000 individually
to the victim's mother by February 2,
1991.
On appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals ofMaryland, both defendants'
convictions were affirmed in an unreported opinion. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted Reddick's petition for certiorari. Reddick contended
that because he is indigent, the offer to
reduce his sentence upon making a
contribution toward the expenses
placed upon the family of the victim
was unconstitutional. He asserted that
this offer constituted an unlawful distinction among sentences based on a
defendant's wealth or poverty, and
therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and
Article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration
of Rights. To further illustrate his
position, Reddick argued that it was
''unconstitutional to incarcerate an indigent defendant fora term longer than
that imposed on a similarly situated
nonindigent defendant who would be
able to make the requisite monetary
payment." Reddick, 327 Md., at 272,
608 A.2d at 1248. Accordingly,

Reddick requested that the court vacate his entire sentence because of the
unconstitutional conditional offer to
suspend five years of his sentence ifhe
paid the victim's family $3,000.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
rejected the State's characterization of
the sentence as an unconditional thirty
year term containing a provision of
certain conduct, compliance with which
the defendant would encourage the trial
judge to modify the sentence. Id. at
273,608 A.2d at 1248. The court also
refused to accept the State's alternative
argument that the trial judge should
simply strike the illegal language containing the offer and allow the thirty
year sentence to stand because pennitting suspension of five years of the
sentence conditioned upon payment of
the victim's medical and funeral expenses was illegal and, thus, null and
void. Id.
Although the court ofappeals agreed
with Reddick's assertion that the offer
constituted a violation ofhis rights, the
court refused to vacate his entire sentence. Id. at 274, 608 A.2d at 1248.
Instead, the court simply struck the
illegal portion ofthe sentence and remanded the case to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City with instructions to
resentence Reddickto a tenn oftwentyfive years. Id. In holding that Judge
Hammerman's offer to suspend part of
the sentence in return for contribution
to the victim's family's expenses was
unconstitutional, the court stated that
where a court has "detennined that a
fine or restitution is an appropriate
sentence, a court cannot then imprison
a defendant solely because of his inability to pay it." Reddick, 327 Md. at
273-74, 608 A.2d at 1248 (citing
Beardenv. Georgia,461 U.S. 660,665
(1983». Applying this principle of
equal protection to the present case, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland characterized Judge Hammerman's offer as a
chance to "buy" a suspended sentence.
Reddick v. State, 327 Md. at 273, 608
A.2d at 1248. The court concluded
that equal protection required that the
unconstitutional portion be stricken

from the sentence; otherwise, it would
imprison Reddick for a longer term
thana similarly situated defendant with
the financial capability to make the
payment. Id. at 274, 608 A.2dat 1248.
The court's holding effectively restricts the ability of the sentencing
judge to allow an indigent defendant
the opportunity to pay restitution for
his victim's expenses in order to reduce the term of incarceration. Where
the defendant's actions place heavy
financial burdens on a victim or his
family, the court has an interest in
seeing that the defendant take as much
responsibility as possible for those expenses. However, an offer ofa reduced
sentence in exchange for contribution
towards a victim's family's financial
burden will run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment where the judge is faced
with an indigent defendant. Thus,
despite a court's concern over expenses
imposed upon a victim's family, the
court cannot offer a defendant the opportunity to pay restitution to his victims at the expense of the defendant's
constitutional rights.
- Paula L. Davis

Two Pesos, Inc. v. TileD Cabana, Inc.:
PROTECTION OF INHERENTLY
DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS
UNDER LANHAM ACT DOES
NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF SECONDARY MEANING.
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992), the United
States Supreme Court allowed protection of a restaurant's inherently distinctive trade dress under section 43(a)
of the Trademark: Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (''Lanham
Act"), which provides protection to
businesses that are harmed by other
businesses using false representation
or description in connection with any
goods or services. Atfrrming the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that secondary
meaning ofthe trade dress was a requisite element of its protection under the
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Lanham Act.
In 1978, Taco Cabana, Inc., a fastfood restaurant which served Mexican
food, opened in San Antonio, Texas.
The restaurant consisted of an interior
dining area and patio decomted in vivid
colors and Mexican artifacts. Paintings, murals, bright awnings and umbrellas created a festive, Mexican atmosphere. The lively theme was enhanced by border paint, neon stripes
and a stepped exterior. Two Pesos,
Inc., a Mexican restaurant with a motif
very similar to that of Taco Cabana,
opened in Houston in 1985. Two
Pesos rapidly expanded through Texas,
but did not enter San Antonio. The
next year, Taco Cabana entered Houston and other cities where Two Pesos
was operating.
In 1987, Taco Cabana sued Two
Pesos in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas for
trade dress infringement under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. The court
instructed the jury that trade dress was
protected if it was either inherently
distinctive or had acquired a secondary
meaning. Id. at 2756. A trademark or
trade dress acquires a secondary meaning when it has become uniquely associated with a specific source through
its use in the marketplace. Id. at 2756
n.4 (citing Restatement (Third) of UnmirCompetition § 13, commente(Tent.
Draft No. 2, Mar. 23,1990». Thejury
concluded Taco Cabana had a trade
dress which was inherently distinctive,
but which had not acquired a secondarymeaning. Id. at 2756. Thejuryalso
held that customers were likely to be
confused as to the source ofthe goods
or services by the alleged infringement. Id. at 2756. Despite the jury's
finding that there was no secondary
meaning, the trial court entered judgment for Taco Cabana. Relying on a
Fifth Circuit decision, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court and rejected Two Pesos'
assertion that a finding ofno secondary
meaning precluded a finding of inherent distinctiveness. Id. Due to the
conflict among the courts of appeals in

several circuits as to the requirement of
secondary meaning, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court began its analysis by
noting that the Lanham Act was intended to create a cause of action
against deceptive and misleading use
oftrademarks and to protect businesses
againstunfaircompetition. Id. at 2757
(citing § 45,15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982».
A trademark consists of "any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof' used by any person ''to
identify and distinguish his or her
goods, includingauniqueproduct, from
those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods
even if that source is unknown." Id. at
2757 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982».
The Court explained that a trademark
must distinguish the particular product
from others in order to be registered,
which is significant because the principles qualifying a mark for registration are applicable to the analysis of
whether an unregistered trademark is
afforded protection under section 43 (a)
of the Lanham Act. Id. at 2757 (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1127 (1982».
The Court identified the categories
set forth by the Second Circuit to determine the distinctiveness of the trademark as the following: (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) funciful. Id. at 2757
(citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World. Inc., 537 F.2d4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976». The Court noted that the
latter three categories are inherently
distinctive, and, therefore, afforded protection under the Lanham Act because
their intrinsic nature identifies the particular source of the product. [d. at
2757.
The Court further explained that
descriptive marks are not inherently
distinctive, because they do not necessarily describe the particular source of
the product, and consequently, cannot
be protected. Id. However, recognizing the ability of descriptive marks to
become distinctive under some circumstances, the Court cited section 2
ofthe Lanham Act which provides that

a descriptive mark may be registered if
it has acquired secondary meaning by
becoming distinctive ofthe applicant's
goods in commerce. Id. (citing §§ 2(e),
(t), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (t) (1982».
The rule regarding distinctiveness is
one in which "an identifying mark is
distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (1) is inherently-distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning." Id.
at 2758 (citing Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition § 13, pp. 37-38,
and comment a (Tent. Draft No.2,
Mar. 23, 1990».
Having assumed the jury was correct in finding that Taco Cabana's trade
dress was inherently distinctive, the
Court directed its attention to whether
proving the existence of a secondary
meaning would be required to allow
protection of an inherently distinctive
trade dress under the Lanham Act. Id.
Trade dress is the total image of the
business, including the exterior appearance ofthe restaurant, identifying
sign, decor, menu, and equipment used
to serve food. Id. at 2755 n.l. The
Court concluded that proof of a secondary meaning was not required. [d
at 2758. Particularly persuasive to the
Court was the reasoning ofthe court of
appeals that protection ofan inherently
distinctive trademark or trade dress
recognized a business owner's interest
in its unique mark, even though consumers had not yet recognized a unique
association between the product and
the source. [d. (quoting Two Pesos.
Inc. v. Taco Cabana. Inc., 932 F.2d
1113, 1120 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991».
Two Pesos conceded that arbitrary
or fanciful trade dresses which had not
acquired secondary meaning, but were
classified as inherently distinctive,
should have been temporarilyprotected
to allow time to develop a secondary
meaning in the market. Id. at 2759.
Two Pesos argued, however, that if
secondary meaning did not develop,
the protection should have then been
withdrawn. [d. The Court interpreted
such a proposal by Two Pesos to be a
recognition of the unfairness inherent
23.2 IT h e Law For u m 31

in a requirement of proving secondary
meaning. Emphasizing that protection
would be given initially only if the
trade dress were inherently distinctive
and capable of identifying the source
ofthe product, the Court noted that the
termination of protection would occur
merely because the business was not
successful enough in the market. Id
Denying protection to a unique trade
dress for this reason was unacceptable
to the Court, which opined that a business in this situation should be afa
forded protection of its unique trade
dress while it enhances its recognition
in the market. Id.
Rejecting the attempted distinction
between trade dress and trademarks,
the Court stated that there is no persuasive reason to apply different analyses
to the two. The Second Circuit allowed protection for suggestive, inherently distinctive trademarks, without
proof of secondary meaning, but denied protection to trade dress without
such proof. Id. (citing Thompson
Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d
208 (2d Cir. 1985». Recognizingthat
proof ofsecondary meaning would not
be required if trademarks were inherently distinctive, the Fifth Circuit held,
contrary to the Second Circuit, that
such a rule should also apply to trade
dress. Id. at 2760 (citing Chevron
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702
(5th Cir. 1981». Agreeing with the
Fifth Circuit, the Court further emphasized that protection oftrademarks and
trade dress serves the same end, which
is to prevent deception and unfair competition. Id. at 2760. Moreover, the
Court noted that section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act does not mention either
trademark or trade dress, and it also
does not mention secondary meaning.
Although section 1052 of the Lanham
Act mentions secondary meaning, the
Court pointed out that the section only
applies to descriptive marks, not to
inherently distinct trade dress. Id. at
2760.
In further support of its holding that
secondary meaning was not required,

the Court expressed concern that a
secondary meaning requirement for
inherently distinct trade dress would
undermine the purpose of the Lanham
Act. Id. The Court noted that the
primary purpose of the Lanham Act is
to protect the goodwill established by
the owner of a unique trademark and
the ability of customers to distinguish
among competing businesses. Id.
Trademarks also enhance competition
and quality by securing to businesses
the benefits of a good reputation. Id.
(citing Park WFly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
andFly,/nc.,469U.S.189,198(1985».
Requiring proofofsecondary meaning
would deny businesses the security of
knowing their trade dress was protected while they improved their market standing. Id.
The Court also rejected the contention that a business which used a certain design first would preclude competition by products of similar design.
Clarifying the status of the law, the
Court stated that only nonfunctional,
distinctive trade dress would be protected by section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. Id. A functional design that is
only one of a few options for competitors would not be protected, because it
would hinder free competition. Id.
However, the Court emphasized that if
secondary meaning was required, competition could be unduly burdened,
particularly for small businesses. Such
a requirement would have allowed a
competitor the opportunity to use the
trade dress of the original business in
new markets, thereby hindering the
originator's ability to expand. Id. at
2761.
In holding that secondary meaning
is not a required element of protection
for inherently distinctive trade dress,
the Two Pesos decision will protect
small business owners who have created a unique image to distinguish
their business from all others and will
guard against replication before the
business is able to establish an association between the trade dress and its
business in the market. Consequently,
competitors will not be permitted to

create a business with an atmosphere
and appearance similar to an existing
business on the basis that the trade
dress of the original business has not
yet established a secondary meaning.
- Susan L. Oliveri

Banks v. State: STATEMENTS
MADE BY VICTIM EXPRESSING
FEAR OF KILLER NOT ADMISSIBLE TO REBUT EVIDENCE OF
BA TTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME.
In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422,
608 A.2d 1249 (1992), the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland held that
statements made by a victim prior to
his death expressing fear of his killer
were inadmissible to rebut evidence of
the battered spouse syndrome. The
court found that the statements at issue
were hearsay and did not fit into any of
the hearsay exceptions.
In the early evening hours of August 14, 1990, Thelma Jean Banks
("Banks") called the Baltimore City
Police and reported that her boyfriend,
James McDonald ("McDonald"), had
been stabbed. When the police arrived, McDonald was dead. Banks
initially told police that she had been
upstairs when intruders broke into the
house and stabbed McDonald, but she
eventually admitted that she stabbed
the victim.
Banks was convicted of second
degree murder by a jwy in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City and was sentenced to a term of twenty years in
prison. At trial, Banks maintained that
she suffered from battered spouse syndrome when she stabbed McDonald.
In support ofthis defense, Banks testified that the victim drank heavily and
often physically abused her. Five other
witnesses also testified that the victim
had abused Banks.
In an attempt to rebut the evidence
supporting the battered spouse syndrome defense, the state offered the
victim's mother and sister who testified that McDonald told them he was
afraid ofBanks because she physically
abused him. Lucille McDonald, the
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